Fix RCE vulnerability and harden security

- Replace eval() with ast.literal_eval() in pdf_utils.py to fix
  unauthenticated remote code execution via crafted PDF uploads
  (reported by OX Security)
- Sanitize HTML output with DOMPurify to prevent XSS
- Restrict CORS origins (configurable via CORS_ORIGINS env var)
- Suppress raw exception details in API error responses
- Cap Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS to prevent decompression bomb DoS
- Add security regression test suite

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ray Dumasia
2026-03-31 09:01:52 +01:00
parent e24f064042
commit 3dac0741b1
6 changed files with 169 additions and 9 deletions

View File

@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ FRONTEND_PORT=3000
MODEL_NAME=deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-OCR
HF_HOME=/models
# CORS Configuration (comma-separated origins, defaults to http://localhost:3000)
CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhost:3000
# Upload Configuration
MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE_MB=100

View File

@@ -86,11 +86,14 @@ app = FastAPI(
)
# CORS middleware for React frontend
CORS_ORIGINS = env_config("CORS_ORIGINS", default="").split(",")
CORS_ORIGINS = [o.strip() for o in CORS_ORIGINS if o.strip()]
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=["*"],
allow_origins=CORS_ORIGINS if CORS_ORIGINS else ["http://localhost:3000"],
allow_credentials=True,
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_methods=["GET", "POST"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
@@ -373,7 +376,8 @@ async def ocr_inference(
})
except Exception as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"{type(e).__name__}: {str(e)}")
print(f"OCR inference error: {type(e).__name__}: {str(e)}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="An internal error occurred during OCR processing.")
finally:
if tmp_img:
@@ -573,9 +577,9 @@ async def process_pdf(
except Exception as e:
import traceback
print(f"Error processing PDF: {e}")
print(f"Error processing PDF: {e}")
print(traceback.format_exc())
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"{type(e).__name__}: {str(e)}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="An internal error occurred during PDF processing.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
host = env_config("API_HOST", default="0.0.0.0")

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ PDF Processing Utilities for DeepSeek OCR
Handles PDF to image conversion and batch processing
"""
import ast
import io
import re
from typing import List, Tuple, Dict, Any
@@ -39,8 +40,8 @@ def pdf_to_images_high_quality(pdf_bytes: bytes, dpi: int = 144) -> List[Image.I
# Render page to pixmap
pixmap = page.get_pixmap(matrix=matrix, alpha=False)
# Allow large images
Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS = None
# Allow reasonably large images (200 megapixels) but not decompression bombs
Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS = 200_000_000
# Convert to PIL Image
img_data = pixmap.tobytes("png")
@@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ def parse_coordinates(ref_text: Tuple, image_width: int, image_height: int) -> D
"""
try:
label_type = ref_text[1]
cor_list = eval(ref_text[2])
cor_list = ast.literal_eval(ref_text[2])
# Scale coordinates from 0-999 to actual pixels
scaled_boxes = []

150
backend/test_security.py Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
"""
Security regression tests for the eval() RCE vulnerability (OX Security disclosure).
The vulnerability allowed arbitrary code execution via crafted OCR output
that was passed to eval() in parse_coordinates(). The fix uses ast.literal_eval()
which only allows literal data structures.
This test is self-contained and does not require backend dependencies.
Run: python test_security.py
"""
import ast
def parse_coordinates(ref_text, image_width, image_height):
"""
Minimal reproduction of pdf_utils.parse_coordinates using the patched code.
This mirrors the fixed version that uses ast.literal_eval() instead of eval().
"""
try:
label_type = ref_text[1]
cor_list = ast.literal_eval(ref_text[2])
scaled_boxes = []
for points in cor_list:
x1, y1, x2, y2 = points
scaled_box = [
int(x1 / 999 * image_width),
int(y1 / 999 * image_height),
int(x2 / 999 * image_width),
int(y2 / 999 * image_height)
]
scaled_boxes.append(scaled_box)
return {
'label': label_type,
'boxes': scaled_boxes
}
except Exception as e:
print(f" [Blocked] {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
return None
def test_legitimate_coordinates():
"""Verify that normal coordinate parsing still works."""
ref_text = ("full_match", "text", "[[312, 339, 480, 681]]")
result = parse_coordinates(ref_text, 1000, 1000)
assert result is not None, "Legitimate coordinates should parse successfully"
assert result['label'] == 'text'
assert len(result['boxes']) == 1
print("PASS: Legitimate coordinates parse correctly")
def test_multiple_boxes():
"""Verify multiple bounding boxes still work."""
ref_text = ("full_match", "image", "[[100, 200, 300, 400], [500, 600, 700, 800]]")
result = parse_coordinates(ref_text, 1000, 1000)
assert result is not None, "Multiple boxes should parse successfully"
assert len(result['boxes']) == 2
print("PASS: Multiple bounding boxes parse correctly")
def test_rce_blocked_import_os():
"""The original exploit: __import__('os').system('...') must be blocked."""
malicious = "__import__('os').system('echo HACKED')"
ref_text = ("full_match", "exploit", malicious)
result = parse_coordinates(ref_text, 1000, 1000)
assert result is None, "Code execution payload should be rejected"
print("PASS: __import__('os').system() payload is blocked")
def test_rce_blocked_exec():
"""exec() based payloads must be blocked."""
malicious = "exec('import os; os.system(\"echo HACKED\")')"
ref_text = ("full_match", "exploit", malicious)
result = parse_coordinates(ref_text, 1000, 1000)
assert result is None, "exec() payload should be rejected"
print("PASS: exec() payload is blocked")
def test_rce_blocked_eval():
"""Nested eval() payloads must be blocked."""
malicious = "eval('__import__(\"os\").popen(\"id\").read()')"
ref_text = ("full_match", "exploit", malicious)
result = parse_coordinates(ref_text, 1000, 1000)
assert result is None, "Nested eval() payload should be rejected"
print("PASS: Nested eval() payload is blocked")
def test_rce_blocked_lambda():
"""Lambda-based payloads must be blocked."""
malicious = "(lambda: __import__('os').system('echo HACKED'))()"
ref_text = ("full_match", "exploit", malicious)
result = parse_coordinates(ref_text, 1000, 1000)
assert result is None, "Lambda payload should be rejected"
print("PASS: Lambda payload is blocked")
def test_rce_blocked_comprehension():
"""List comprehension code execution must be blocked."""
malicious = "[__import__('os').system('echo HACKED') for x in [1]]"
ref_text = ("full_match", "exploit", malicious)
result = parse_coordinates(ref_text, 1000, 1000)
assert result is None, "List comprehension payload should be rejected"
print("PASS: List comprehension payload is blocked")
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("=" * 60)
print("Security Regression Tests (OX Security RCE disclosure)")
print("=" * 60)
print()
tests = [
test_legitimate_coordinates,
test_multiple_boxes,
test_rce_blocked_import_os,
test_rce_blocked_exec,
test_rce_blocked_eval,
test_rce_blocked_lambda,
test_rce_blocked_comprehension,
]
passed = 0
failed = 0
for test in tests:
try:
test()
passed += 1
except AssertionError as e:
print(f"FAIL: {test.__name__}: {e}")
failed += 1
except Exception as e:
print(f"ERROR: {test.__name__}: {e}")
failed += 1
print()
print(f"Results: {passed} passed, {failed} failed out of {len(tests)} tests")
if failed == 0:
print("All security tests passed - RCE vulnerability is patched.")
else:
print("WARNING: Some tests failed!")

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
},
"dependencies": {
"axios": "^1.6.5",
"dompurify": "^3.3.3",
"framer-motion": "^11.0.0",
"lucide-react": "^0.344.0",
"react": "^18.3.1",

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { useEffect, useRef, useState, useCallback } from 'react'
import { motion, AnimatePresence } from 'framer-motion'
import { Copy, Download, Sparkles, Loader2, CheckCircle2, ChevronDown } from 'lucide-react'
import ReactMarkdown from 'react-markdown'
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify'
export default function ResultPanel({ result, loading, imagePreview, onCopy, onDownload }) {
const canvasRef = useRef(null)
@@ -230,7 +231,7 @@ export default function ResultPanel({ result, loading, imagePreview, onCopy, onD
{isHTML ? (
<div
className="prose prose-invert prose-sm max-w-none"
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: result.text }}
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: DOMPurify.sanitize(result.text) }}
style={{
color: '#e5e7eb',
}}